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Abstract: In response to a “crisis” in Social Security financing two decades ago Congress implemented an 
increase in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) of two months per year for cohorts born in 1938 and after. 
These cohorts began reaching retirement age in 2000. This paper studies the effects of these benefit cuts on 
recent retirement behavior. The evidence strongly suggests that the mean retirement age of the affected 
cohorts has increased by about half as much as the increase in the NRA. If older workers continue to increase 
their labor supply in the same way, there will be important implications for the estimates of Social Security 
trust fund exhaustion that have played such a major role in recent discussions of Social Security reform. 
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In 1983, the U.S. Congress implemented an increase in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA)
of two months per year. Each two-months increase in the NRA translates into a little
more than a 1 percentage point reduction in Social Security bene¯ts. This reform is likely
to in°uence two important decisions that workers face at the end of their careers: (1)
when to start collecting Social Security bene¯ts, and (2) when to retire. Since bene¯ts
are adjusted actuarially with respect to the entitlement age, the long-term solvency of
the Social Security trust fund depends more on retirement decisions than on claiming
decisions. An increase in labor force participation generates more contributions, which
are the trust fund's main source of revenue.
This paper studies the e®ects of an increase in the NRA on recent retirement be-
havior, providing the ¯rst ex-post evaluation of the reform.1 The evaluation yields both
substantive evidence to inform future reforms and a guide to the calibration of structural
models of retirement decisions. The results also raise serious questions about how best to
improve the models on which earlier research was based. Using the change in the NRA
to estimate the e®ect of Social Security incentives on labor supply provides additional
bene¯ts: the exact change in bene¯ts is known, it is not prone to measurement error, and
it is exogenous.
Due to the timing of the reform, workers born before 1938 are the control group
and workers born in or after 1938, those who experience a reduction in bene¯ts, are the
treatment group. The analysis uses monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data from
January 1989 to January 2006.
Figure 1 shows the changes in average retirement age with respect to the 1937 cohort.
Because of censoring, I focus on workers younger than 66, which leaves three treated
1Coile and Gruber (n.d.), Panis, Hurd, Loughran, Zissimopoulos, Haider and St.Clair (2002), Fields
and Mitchell (1984), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) use pre-reform data to simulate the e®ect of an
increase in the NRA on labor supply.
2cohorts: 1938, 1939, and 1940. The dotted lines show piecewise-linear ¯ts. In all plots
there is a clear break in the trend toward later retirement between the 1937 and the 1938
birth year, and the break is even more evident when a restricted sample is used to correct
for measurement error in the year of birth variable.2
The most obvious cause of this change is the increase in the NRA. Point estimates
imply an increase in the actual age of retirement of about 50 percent of the increase in
the NRA for both men and women. These results do not change when controlling for
changes in socioeconomic characteristics.
Previous studies, using out-of-sample predictions, have estimated much smaller e®ects
on labor force participation. Four major factors may have biased previous estimates,
arguably toward zero. First, projections do not capture possible changes linked to norms
that are related to the NRA. Evidence suggests that some workers look at the NRA as a
focal point. Mastrobuoni (2006b) shows that the distribution of the age at which treated
workers claim their Social Security bene¯ts no longer spikes at age 65, but at the NRA.
Second, given that bene¯ts are a function of past earnings, estimates based on these
models may su®er from endogeneity bias. The third source of bias is that these models,
since they are estimated using cross-sectional variation in Social Security bene¯ts and
retirement status, may capture long-term e®ects, while the 1983 bene¯t cuts may have
been unexpected. Using a simple intertemporal model of retirement, I show that this can
generate larger changes in the average retirement age than would otherwise be expected.3
The fourth problem is that in order to construct Social Security wealth, a component of all
forward-looking incentives to retire, the researcher needs detailed information about past
and future earnings, family structure (because of the dependent spouse and child bene¯ts
and the survivors bene¯ts), interest rates, and preferences; in short, measurement error
may be an issue. The increase in the NRA generates a reduction in Social Security wealth
2As ¯rst noted by Quinn (1999) the early retirement trend has reversed and is now decreasing.
3Bene¯t increases, instead, may generate smaller reductions in labor-supply when workers learn too
late about them (Burtless 1986).
3that is exogenous and free of measurement error.
Despite the 1983 reform, the trust fund is projected to become insolvent in less than
40 years. While this date of insolvency is often portrayed by the news media as certain,
it is only an estimate. One of the most important sources of uncertainty is the behavior
of future workers and retirees.4 The NRA is scheduled to reach age 66 for the 1943 birth
cohort, stay at that level for 12 years, and later resume the increase until it reaches age
67. To make better predictions, it is important to understand how these changes a®ect
retirement behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple intertemporal model
of retirement. Its main purpose is to highlight that transitional e®ects arising from un-
expected bene¯t cuts can generate large changes in the labor supply. Section 3 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 4 shows that the estimated changes in retirement behavior
are larger than previous out-of-sample predictions would suggest. Section 5 concludes the
paper and Appendix A describes the data.
2 A Simple Intertemporal Model of Retirement
Life-cycle theory predicts that a worker's reaction to bene¯t cuts{a decrease in lifetime
income{will depend on when one ¯rst learns about the reform. Attentive workers may
have started reacting to the reform in 1983, and after 20 years of consumption-smoothing,
the change in retirement behavior is likely to be small for them. Others may have learned
about the increase in the NRA in 1995 when the SSA began mailing a Social Security
Statement to all workers age 60 and over. The statement shows estimated bene¯ts at
di®erent ages of retirement, including the ¯rst possible age of retirement and the NRA.
Also, in 2000, the SSA added a special insert to the statement describing the changes in
the NRA. The statements signi¯cantly improve workers' knowledge about their bene¯ts
4See Anderson, Lee and Tuljapurkar (2003)
4(Mastrobuoni 2006a). In contrast, very distracted workers may not learn about the change
in NRA until they claim their bene¯ts.
The purpose of the model is to show that the reaction in terms of both consumption
and retirement depends on the date at which the worker learns about the bene¯t cut. The
model is standard; it assumes that workers maximize their utility over consumption (C)
and the time of retirement (z). Retirement is an absorbing state, workers claim bene¯ts
at the time they retire and face a perfect capital market, with a rate of return r. There is


























where D is the date of death, delta the discount rate, and W is the stream of earnings that
enter the bene¯t formula. To obtain closed-form solutions, the utility function is assumed
to be logarithmic. Disutility from work is captured by an additive constant UW = UR¡²,
where UW is a worker's utility level and UR is the worker's utility in retirement. In
this setup, e² is the factor by which the worker's consumption must be increased to
generate the same utility for the retiree. This disutility from work may additionally
capture the observation that retirees tend to make better consumption choices (Aguiar
and Hurst 2005) and that retirees do not have work-related costs. For simplicity the
rate of preference equals the interest rate, ± = r, and real wages are constant over time,
Wt = W. The bene¯t formula used by the SSA expresses bene¯ts as a function of past
wages. Bene¯ts increase with the di®erence between age of retirement and the NRA,
5z ¡ NRA:
R(z;NRA;W) = R(W)(1 + g(z ¡ NRA)) :
The policy variables are g, the actuarial adjustment factor, and the NRA. I focus
on the NRA showing in Appendix B that this simple model generates two important
predictions. First, for reasonable parameters, increasing the NRA delays retirement and
reduces consumption. This result implicitly assumes that Social Security rules change at
time zero. Second, for reasonable parameters, if rules change when the worker is already
working, the response in terms of consumption and retirement is stronger. This occurs
because an early-informed worker has more time to smooth consumption over time, and
thus will not postpone retirement as much as a late-informed one.
3 Empirical Strategy
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of retirement age by year of
birth groups. The CDF for the treated cohorts is truncated at age 67, which corresponds
to year 2005 for the ¯rst treated cohort (1938). Across all birth cohorts male workers
exhibit very similar retirement patterns before age 62. For female workers there is a clear
trend toward later retirement at all ages.
The only age range for which the pattern of retirement of the treated cohorts di®ers
systematically from that of the control group is 62{65. At these ages treated workers
(group 4), are more likely to be in the labor force than are untreated workers (groups 1,
2 and 3). Correcting for measurement error in the year of birth variable, this di®erence
is even more pronounced (Figure 3).
These di®erences might, for example, depend on di®erent educational attainments. In
6order to parametrically control for such confounding e®ects (X), the distance between the















0Xi + ²i ; (3)
where yi is equal to 1 when the worker is retired and zero otherwise. Retirement is de¯ned
as \out of the labor force", although results based on a more precise de¯nition are almost
identical.5 The indicator function 1(Ai = a) is equal to 1 if the worker is a years old and
0 otherwise, and 1(C¤
i = c) is equal to 1 if the worker is born in year c and 0 otherwise.
Since the speci¯cation includes all age dummies and omits the 1937 cohort dummy
and the constant term, ¯a;c measures the di®erence at age a between cohort c's and cohort
1937's CDF of retirement age, b ¯a;c = E[Y jC = c;a;X]¡E[Y jC = 1937;a;X]. Continuous
Xs are not included in the regression, hence the linear probability model is completely
general.
One limitation of the data is that the year of birth variable may be misclassi¯ed.6 CPS
data contain information about the respondent's years of age at the time of the interview,
but not the year of birth.7 Age at the time of the survey coupled with the information of
the survey year and survey month provides, at best, an imperfect measure of the year of
5The more precise measure is only available after 1994, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics added
retirement status to the labor force recode variable.
6Misclassi¯cation errors are not uncommon in empirical research. In a paper that analyzes the impact
of the earnings test on labor supply, Gruber and Orszag (2003) take the most conservative approach of
deleting observations for which ambiguity exists about the earnings test regime. Krueger and Pischke
(1992) warn the reader that the probability of misclassi¯cation is approximately 20 percent when using
the March CPS to establish the year of birth, but they do not explicitly correct for that.
7CPS respondents provide their date of birth, though this information is later discarded from the
public-use data. Unfortunately, because of the weak follow-up and the noisy identi¯cation of observations
across waves, using the longitudinal component of the CPS allows me to get an exact measure of the year
of birth for only a few observations. To match observations over time, I use the conservative approach of
¯rst matching by the CPS identi¯ers (hrhhid huhhnum hurespl), race and gender. After this ¯rst step,
whenever the standard deviation of age is bigger than one-half, I additionally match by education, which
for elderly people is normally constant over time (Madrian and Lefgren 1999).
7birth.
Months of birth are almost uniformly distributed (Table 1); as a result the probability
of misclassifying the year of birth based on the survey month is known. If one simply
generates the birth cohort as the di®erence between the survey year and age, in a January
survey the probability of misclassifying someone's birth year is around 11=12; someone
surveyed in January is likely to have been born later in the year. The probability of mis-
classi¯cation is 10=12 in February, and, carrying out the calculation, zero in December.8
Using this method, the probability of misclassi¯cation would on average be one-half.
A better way to assign the birth year is to minimize the probability of misclassi¯cation.
Adding a year to the cohort if the survey month falls in the ¯rst half of the year reduces
the average probability of misclassi¯cation to one-quarter. I call this the \naive method."
Additionally restricting the sample to the January and December surveys, the probability
of misclassi¯cation is only 1/12. I call this the \restricted method."
There is an obvious trade-o® between minimizing the probability of misclassi¯cation
and maximizing the statistical power. To avoid this trade-o® and work with the whole
sample I also use the \sophisticated method", which makes full use of the known proba-
bilities of misclassi¯cation (Aigner 1973). The only empirical paper I am aware of that
uses a similar approach is Card and Krueger (1992). Let Y 2 f0;1g be 1 if the worker is
retired and de¯ne C¤ to be the true cohort and C the observed cohort (equal to the di®er-
ence between the survey year and age). The misclassi¯cation probabilities depend on the
survey month m, p(m) = Pr(C¤ = c¡1jC = c;m). Pr(Y = 1jC = c;m;a;X) = E[Y jC =
c;m;a;X] represents the conditional probability of having retired by age a, given that in
month m a worker is observed to be born in year c, while E[Y jC¤ = c;m;a;X] represents
the probability of being retired given that a worker is truly born in year c. For ease of
notation the other independent variables X are omitted, but probabilities that are not
8To be more precise, given that the survey week always contains the 19th of the month, the probability
is (365-19)/365 in January and 11/365 in December.
8misclassi¯cation probabilities are supposed to be conditional on X.
Assuming that given the true cohort, the mismeasured cohort is not informative, one
¯nds that
E[Y jC = c;C
¤ = c;m;a] = E[Y jC
¤ = c;m;a] :
By the law of total probability,
E[Y jC = c;m;a] = (1 ¡ p(m))E[Y jC
¤ = c;m;a] + p(m)E[Y jC
¤ = c ¡ 1;m;a] : (4)
The probability of being retired depends on the survey month as well, since, conditional
on a birth year (the true or the observed one), workers tend to be older later in the
year. Assuming that conditional on cohort C¤, the dependence on the survey month is
additively separable and does not change across cohorts, E[Y jC¤ = c;m;a] = E[Y jC¤ =
c;a] + g(m;a). Plugging this into equation (4), it follows that
E[Y jC = c;m;a] = (1 ¡ p(m))E[Y jC
¤ = c;a] + p(m)E[Y jC
¤ = c ¡ 1;a] + g(m;a) (5)
Averaging over the di®erent survey months and de¯ning p =
P
m p(m)Pr(M = m)
results in
E[Y jC = c;a] = (1 ¡ p)E[Y jC
¤ = c;a] + pE[Y jC
¤ = c ¡ 1;a] + g(a) ;
where g(a) = E(g(m)). Since the average g(a) depends on m, it is important to keep a
similar distribution of survey months when comparing di®erent cohorts. Having this in
mind, if all months of the year are included in the empirical analysis, from the de¯nition
E[Y jC¤ = c;m;a] = E[Y jC¤ = c;a] + g(m;a), it follows that g(a) is zero.
Solving equation (5) for the probability of being retired for the true cohort c, gives a
9recursive formula, in which this probability is a function of the observed probability, and
the true probability of being retired for cohort c ¡ 1, that is,
E[Y jC
¤ = c;a] =
E[Y jC = c;a] ¡ E[Y jC¤ = c ¡ 1;a]p
1 ¡ p
: (6)
As a starting point for the recursion let us assume that the probability of being
retired for cohort 1928 and 1927, 10 years before the treatment begins, are the same
E[Y jC¤ = 1927;a] = E[Y jC¤ = 1928;a], which implies that E[Y jC¤ = 1928;a] =
E[Y jC = 1928;a].9 Observing several pre-treatment cohorts allows us to properly con-
trol for preexisting trends toward earlier or later retirement. This recursion (with initial
condition Pr(C¤













0Xi + ²i ; (7)
where b °a;c is the empirical counterpart of E[Y jC¤ = c;a].10
The di®erence between the cohorts' cumulative distribution functions using the so-
phisticated method is equal to b ¯a;c = b °a;c ¡ b °1937;c. In Section 4 I report the estimation
results obtained using the three methods to correct for the misclassi¯cation error.
An easily interpretable result can be obtained from the sum of the estimated ¯-
coe±cients, which is equal to the di®erence between cohort c and cohort 1937 average
9The empirical CDF of the two cohort are indeed very similar.
10Conditional on c, a, and X = 0:
E[Y jC = c;a;X] = °a;c Pr(C¤ = cjC = c) + °a;c¡1 Pr(C¤ = c ¡ 1jC = c)
= °a;c(1 ¡ p) + °a;c¡1p (8)
Rearranging terms,
°a;c =
E[Y jC = c;a;X] ¡ °a;c¡1p
1 ¡ p
; (9)
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where Prc(A = a) represents the fraction of workers born in year c who retire at age a.
Finally, the di®erence between the post- and the pre-1937 cohort yearly trend of the
average retirement age is simply a weighted average of the di®erent ¢cs:
















Tables 2 and 3 contain the summary statistics of the full sample and the restricted sample.
The cohorts are similar in terms of racial composition and household size, though younger
cohorts tend to be more educated.
I estimate equation (3) separately for men and women. Table 4 and 5 show the results
where the estimated distance between the cumulative distribution functions (b ¯2) are only
shown for workers born in 1936 or later, and the three di®erent methods of correcting for
misclassi¯cation are employed (sophisticated, naive, and restricted).
Columns (1), (3) and (5) contain only age and cohort dummies, where columns (2),
(4) and (6) additionally control for marital status, education, race, total members of the
household, and geographic region. Controlling for these variables reduces the estimates
11only slightly. The main result is that for all three models and for both men and women,
the estimated di®erence in CDFs between the 1938, 1939, and 1940 cohorts, and the 1937
cohort, is mostly negative. This indicates that in the 62 to 65 age range, the CDF of
the 1937 cohort lies above the CDF of the other three cohorts, which means that workers
born in 1938 retire later than workers born just one year earlier.
For each cohort Tables 6 and 7 report the sum of the estimated coe±cients, the
sample equivalent of equation (10). These estimates, multiplied by 12 to obtain monthly
values, represent the change with respect to the 1937 cohort in the average retirement
age. Although not all post-reform b ¯s are signi¯cant, most of the corresponding sums are
signi¯cant at the one percent level, which suggests that the increase in the NRA generates
an increase in the average retirement age. On the other hand, the di®erences between the
CDFs before the reform tend to be smaller and not signi¯cant.
Table 8 shows the estimates of equation (11) (the slopes of the linear ¯t in Figure 1).
The preexisting trend of the average retirement age is steeper for women than for men,
but this can be explained by the change in socioeconomic factors. When controlling
for demographic characteristics, for both men and women the preexisting trend is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In contrast, the trend among the treated cohorts is
between 1 and 1.2 months (signi¯cant at the 1 percent level). Since every year the NRA
is increasing by two months, the relative change is approximately 50 percent. Controlling
for other variables seems to have only a small e®ect. Notice also that the naive method
underestimates the e®ect by one-half.
These estimates are more than three times as large as previous out-of-sample predic-
tions, which suggested that the labor supply response to the change in the NRA would
be small. For example, Coile and Gruber (n.d.) simulate the e®ect on retirement of a
one year increase in the NRA. Depending on the speci¯cation used, they predict that
the average age of retirement should increase by between 0.5 and 2 months (using the
1261{65 age range). Similarly, Panis, Hurd, Loughran, Zissimopoulos, Haider and St.Clair
(2002) predict an increase in the average retirement age of about seven days. Both studies
rely on estimates based on the cross-sectional variation in labor supply that is related to
di®erences in Social Security bene¯ts.
Three major factors are likely to create a bias in out-of-sample predictions. First,
present discounted values of future streams of bene¯ts are likely to be measured with
error. Second, these predictions do not capture the potential e®ect of unexpected bene¯t
changes. Finally, simulations only account for the ¯nancial implications of the increase in
the NRA, and not for any \norms" related to the NRA (i.e., the use of the NRA as a focal
point as in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise 1995). Axtell and Epstein (1999), for example,
suggest that the spike in the distribution of retirement age at 65 may not entirely be
the product of fully rational decision-making and may instead be the outcome of herd
behavior.
Observing the actual changes avoids all three problems. Making use of an exact and
exogenous reduction in Social Security bene¯ts (and their present discounted value) gives
estimates that account for changes potentially related to norms.
4.1 Alternative Explanations
The identi¯cation is based on the assumption that the observed trend-discontinuity in
the average retirement age is due to the change in the NRA. Since for the treated cohorts
the estimated ¯2s are negative at all ages, it is unlikely that yearly shocks are driving
the results. Consider, for example, the stock market crisis of 2001. Workers with de¯ned
contribution plans may have reacted to such shocks by working longer in order to make
up for ¯nancial losses. Yet, in 2000 there are already notable di®erences between the CDF
of treated cohorts and untreated cohorts.
Also, at the time of the 2002{2003 stock market crisis, the youngest cohort (1940) is
13already 63 years old. Unless the e®ect related to the stock market crisis is heterogenous
across ages, it will di®erence out when summing the ¯s to get the e®ect on the average
retirement age. Moreover, Coile and Levine (2004) ¯nd no evidence that changes in
the stock market drive aggregate trends in labor supply. This is mainly due to the fact
that, although 45 percent of all workers are covered by a pension plan, few of them have
substantial stock holdings.
Another possible confounding e®ect is the 2000 Earnings Test removal. Earnings of
Social Security bene¯ciaries above the earnings test threshold, up to their bene¯t amount,
are taxed away at a 50 percent rate between age 62 and the NRA, and at a 33 percent
rate between the NRA and 69. The 33 percent rate was eliminated in 2000. The bene¯ts
that are taxed away due to the earnings test are not lost, but postponed at an actuarially
fair rate. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that people perceive the earnings test as a pure
tax (Gruber and Orszag 2003).
If workers decide to continue working to reach the age at which they can work without
being taxed, part of the change that I attribute to the NRA reform might be due to the
earnings test removal. But several factors suggest that there is no confounding. First, in
2000, the oldest treated workers are only 62 years old. A confounding e®ect would only be
possible if spillovers reach back more than three years. Second, the earnings test removal
would generate a single change, not a change in the trend.
To exclude the possibility that results are driven by labor market shocks, I have
estimated the same regression using weekly hours of work as the dependent variable
(excluding retirees). There are no signi¯cant di®erences in hours of work across these
cohorts. Also, the results are not driven by di®erences in part-time work or disability
status. Excluding disabled workers, or part-time workers (those working less than 35
hours per week) from the analysis does not alter the results.11
11Since the bene¯ts cuts do not apply to disability bene¯ts, the disability insurance is becoming a more
attractive alternative to retirement. Duggan, Singleton and Song (2005) ¯nd that workers born in or
after 1938 are more likely to apply for SSA disability bene¯ts than workers born between 1935 and 1937,
145 Conclusions
An aging population and low labor force participation rates have worsened the ¯nancial
situation of the Social Security trust fund. Aware of this in 1983, on the recommendation
of the Greenspan commission, the U.S. Congress passed several reforms. Their aim was
to cut bene¯ts and increase labor force participation. Among other changes, the reform
scheduled an increase in the normal retirement age (reducing the bene¯ts) for workers
born after 1938.
I ¯nd evidence that workers reacted strongly to this increase in the NRA. The average
retirement age for cohorts that are subject to increasing NRAs is rising by about 1 month
every year, or 50 percent of the increase in the NRA. To obtain an estimated change in
the average retirement trend that is based on more cohorts or on a wider age interval, the
analysis presented here must be repeated in a few years. But given that there is intense,
ongoing work to reform Social Security, conducting early analysis even with limited data
is important.
Despite the 1983 reform, the Social Security trust fund is projected to become insolvent
in 40 years. The Social Security projections are only one of several projections made by
other institutions. A common feature of all projections is that they depend heavily on
the way the future behavior is modeled. My results may help evaluate the importance of
an increase in the NRA on labor force participation.
According to the 2003 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (Technical Panel
on Assumptions and Methods 2003), little documentation is available on how the trustees
forecast labor force participation. The same panel explains that the method is based on
three steps: the ¯rst is to estimate autoregressive labor force participation rates models
that control for economic, demographic, and policy variables for di®erent groups based on
\age, sex, marital status, and presence of children." For older people hazard rates are used
but their estimates are quite small and do not a®ect my results.
15instead of LFPRs. Social Security bene¯ts (relative to past earnings) and the fraction
of workers a®ected by the Social Security earnings test are included in the regressions.
The second step is to subjectively adjust some estimated coe±cients based on economic
theory, prior beliefs, and the \full mosaic" of all estimated models. The last step is to
estimate ¯tted values based on projections of explanatory variables.
This model is likely to be accurate if changes are smooth over time. The problem is
that the increase in the NRA may have introduced a break in the trend at the end of the
period used by the trustees. Therefore, the break might be di±cult to detect, especially
if age groups (various birth years) are merged together.
According to the 2004 Trustees report \changes in available bene¯t levels from Social
Security and increases in the normal retirement age, and the e®ects of modifying the
earnings test are expected to encourage work at higher ages. Some of these factors are
modeled directly." Nevertheless, the Social Security Advisory Board (Technical Panel on
Assumptions and Methods 2003) recommends that \Social Security should be considered
explicitly since it may result in higher participation rates." If the increase in NRA con-
tinues increasing the labor force participation of older workers, the trustees should follow
this recommendation.
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19A Data
I use the CPS monthly data from January 1989 to January 2006. The CPS data contain
information about the respondent's age by the end of the survey week, usually the second
week of the month.12 I restrict the data to individuals born between 1928 and 1940, aged
61{65. Workers who retire early need to wait at least until age 62 before claiming their
bene¯ts. Di®erences in retirement rates before 62 are therefore unlikely to be related to
the increase in the NRA. However, these restrictions represent conservative choices and
may underestimate the overall e®ect since, as will be shown later, di®erences in retirement
rates under age 62 and above age 65 are small, indicating that the bias is likely to be
small. The CPS has a much larger sample size than the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS). For each 1928-1940 birth cohort, aged between 61 and 65, there are around 60,000
observations, while the Health and Retirement Survey contains only 1000 observations
for people born in 1937 and aged 61{63. Another advantage of the CPS data is that the
data are published soon after the interviews take place. HRS data do not contain enough
treated cohorts in the age range 62{65.
The disadvantage of these data is that there is no information on Social Security
insured status. Fortunately, almost all active and retired men and women above 62
are eligible for Social Security bene¯ts (Panis, Hurd, Loughran, Zissimopoulos, Haider
and St.Clair 2002). The analysis uses unweighted data. Using CPS weights, results are
similar, but according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics weighting revisions a®ected the
comparability of the CPS weights over time (Bowler, Ilg, Miller, Robison and Polivka
2003).
12The reference week for CPS is the week (Sunday through Saturday) of the month containing the 12th
day.
20B The inter-temporal model or retirement
The ¯rst order conditions of the model are:
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Given these assumptions, the system of equations that de¯ne the equilibrium is:
²C = W ¡ R(1 +
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Notice that if r(z¡NRA)+er(z¡D)¡1 < 0, then ¢ < 0. The ¯rst expression can only
be positive if the worker retires after his or her NRA (z > NRA) and the interest rate
is extremely large. It follows that for reasonable parameters the retirement age increases
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> 0 :
Notice that the ¯rst term is always positive, while the second is not. Now assume that
22an increase of NRA to NRA0 has not been anticipated. Up to time z the worker behaves
as in the previous case
²C = W ¡ R(1 +
:05
10













1 ¡ e¡rDW +
e¡rz ¡ e¡rD


































or simplifying as before, s.t.














































































































































¡rz (W ¡ R) < 0 :
To show that the myopic worker has, ceteris paribus, a higher optimal age of retirement
after the an increase of NRA, I evaluate dz
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Figure 1: Change in the average retirement age (in months) with respect to the 1937 birth
cohort (solid line) and its piecewise linear ¯t (dots).
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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
retirement age
Women−full sample, 1928−30 (1), 1931−34 (2), 1935−37 (3), 1938−41 (4)
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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
retirement age
Women−restricted sample, 1928−30 (1), 1931−34 (2), 1935−37 (3), 1938−41 (4)
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function of retirement age. Restricted sample.
26Table 1: EMPIRICAL AND UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION OF
MONTHS OF BIRTH.
Month Emprical Empirical CDF Uniform Uniform CDF
1 9.28 9.28 8.33 8.33
2 8.17 17.45 8.33 16.67
3 8.72 26.16 8.33 25.00
4 8.51 34.68 8.33 33.33
5 7.97 42.65 8.33 41.67
6 8.28 50.93 8.33 50.00
7 9.14 60.07 8.33 58.33
8 9.79 69.86 8.33 66.67
9 8.26 78.12 8.33 75.00
10 7.56 85.68 8.33 83.33
11 8.27 93.95 8.33 91.67
12 6.05 100 8.33 100.00
NOTE.{ The empirical distribution is based on 7801 certain matches born
between 1937 and 1939 and aged 61 to 65.
Table 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE AGED 61-65 (FULL SAM-
PLE).
1928{1930 1931{1934 1935{1937 1938{1941
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 62.93 1.41 62.91 1.42 63.03 1.43 63.05 1.41
Year 1992.2 1.73 1995.8 1.91 1999.5 1.74 2002.2 1.59
Male 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50
Retired (NILF) 60.41 48.90 59.21 49.15 57.87 49.38 55.28 49.72
Employed 38.06 48.55 39.31 48.84 40.90 49.17 43.31 49.55
Not married 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.5 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46
<High Sc. 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39
Some college 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36
College 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Black 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.28
Asian 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Other race 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12
#HH=1 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38
#HH>2 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
Midwest 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
South 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
West 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
NOTE.{ SD denotes the standard deviation. There are 828,535 observations.
27Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE AGED 61-65 (RESTRICTED
SAMPLE).
1928{1930 1931{1934 1935{1937 1938{1941
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 62.92 1.41 62.91 1.42 63.02 1.43 63.03 1.41
Year 1992.1 1.71 1995.7 1.91 1999.4 1.74 2002.1 1.60
Male 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50
Retired (NILF) 59.76 49.04 58.76 49.23 57.75 49.40 54.08 49.83
Employed 38.71 48.71 39.65 48.92 41.03 49.19 44.39 49.69
Not married 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46
<High Sc. 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
Some college 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37
College 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Black 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Asian 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16
Other race 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12
#HH=1 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39
#HH>2 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40
Midwest 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
South 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
West 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
NOTE.{ SD denotes the standard deviation. There are 158,959 observations.
28Table 4: ESTIMATED DIFFERENCES (IN PERCENT) IN THE
CDFs OF RETIREMENT AGE FOR FEMALES IN THE SAMPLE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sophisticated Naive Restricted
Age 61&Coh.36 -6.5 -6.7 -3.7 -4.2 -6.9 -7.0
(2.0)** (1.9)** (1.4)** (1.3)** (2.3)** (2.3)**
Age 62&Coh.36 -3.7 -4.0 -1.9 -2.4 -3.4 -3.6
(1.9) (1.9)* (1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (2.3)
Age 63&Coh.36 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.3
(1.9) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (2.3)
Age 64&Coh.36 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.7 0.6
(1.8) (1.8) (1.3) (1.2) (2.2) (2.2)
Age 65&Coh.36 -2.4 -2.4 -1.0 -1.1 -0.5 -1.1
(1.7) (1.6) (1.1) (1.1) (2.0) (2.0)
Age 61&Coh.38 -3.4 -3.1 -1.8 -1.6 -1.7 -1.3
(1.9) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.2) (2.2)
Age 62&Coh.38 -5.0 -4.7 -3.1 -2.8 -4.4 -4.4
(1.9)** (1.9)* (1.3)* (1.3)* (2.3) (2.2)*
Age 63&Coh.38 -2.2 -1.7 -2.0 -1.6 -0.5 -0.8
(1.9) (1.8) (1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (2.3)
Age 64&Coh.38 -4.2 -3.9 -3.3 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1
(1.8)* (1.7)* (1.2)** (1.2)** (2.2) (2.1)
Age 65&Coh.38 -3.7 -3.4 -2.2 -2.1 -1.8 -1.8
(1.7)* (1.6)* (1.1)* (1.1) (2.0) (2.0)
Age 61&Coh.39 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.6 -5.4 -4.7
(1.8)* (1.7)* (1.4)* (1.3) (2.3)* (2.3)*
Age 62&Coh.39 -6.4 -5.1 -4.9 -3.9 -9.4 -8.7
(1.7)** (1.6)** (1.3)** (1.3)** (2.3)** (2.2)**
Age 63&Coh.39 -3.7 -2.5 -3.4 -2.3 -4.9 -4.3
(1.7)* (1.6) (1.3)* (1.3) (2.3)* (2.2)
Age 64&Coh.39 -2.2 -2.0 -2.8 -2.4 -3.5 -3.2
(1.6) (1.5) (1.2)* (1.2)* (2.2) (2.1)
Age 65&Coh.39 -4.2 -3.5 -3.0 -2.4 -5.2 -4.7
(1.5)** (1.5)* (1.2)* (1.2)* (2.1)* (2.0)*
Age 61&Coh.40 -9.3 -8.3 -7.0 -6.4 -10.1 -8.7
(2.0)** (1.9)** (1.5)** (1.5)** (2.5)** (2.4)**
Age 62&Coh.40 -6.8 -6.0 -5.3 -4.6 -11.4 -10.6
(2.0)** (2.0)** (1.6)** (1.5)** (2.5)** (2.4)**
Age 63&Coh.40 -3.5 -3.1 -2.9 -2.3 -5.9 -5.4
(2.0) (2.0) (1.6) (1.5) (2.5)* (2.5)*
Age 64&Coh.40 -4.8 -4.0 -3.4 -2.8 -4.6 -3.7
(1.9)* (1.9)* (1.5)* (1.5) (2.4) (2.4)
Age 65&Coh.40 -4.4 -2.8 -3.1 -1.8 -5.4 -4.0
(1.8)* (1.8) (1.4)* (1.4) (2.3)* (2.3)
Other Xs no yes no yes no yes
Observations 440157 440157 420785 420785 84682 84682
R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.67
NOTE.{ Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses, * signi¯cant at 5
percent, ** signi¯cant at 1 percent. Other Xs include marital status, education,
race, total members of the household and geographic region.
29Table 5: ESTIMATED DIFFERENCES (IN PERCENT) IN THE
CDFs OF RETIREMENT AGE FOR MALES IN THE SAMPLE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sophisticated Naive Restricted
Age 61&Coh.36 0.7 0.6 2.0 2.0 0.2 0.9
(2.0) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.4) (2.3)
Age 62&Coh.36 -3.2 -3.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.8 1.0
(2.0) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.4) (2.3)
Age 63&Coh.36 -2.2 -2.2 -1.3 -1.3 -0.7 -0.4
(2.1) (2.1) (1.5) (1.4) (2.5) (2.5)
Age 64&Coh.36 0.6 -0.0 0.6 0.2 2.2 1.5
(2.1) (2.0) (1.4) (1.4) (2.5) (2.5)
Age 65&Coh.36 -1.9 -2.5 -0.8 -1.2 -0.5 -1.1
(1.8) (1.8) (1.2) (1.2) (2.3) (2.2)
Age 61&Coh.38 -2.9 -2.5 -1.8 -1.3 -4.4 -4.2
(1.9) (1.8) (1.3) (1.2) (2.3) (2.2)
Age 62&Coh.38 -4.6 -4.4 -1.5 -1.2 -6.2 -6.1
(2.0)* (2.0)* (1.4) (1.4) (2.4)* (2.4)*
Age 63&Coh.38 -6.4 -6.2 -4.0 -3.7 -3.4 -2.6
(2.0)** (2.0)** (1.4)** (1.4)** (2.5) (2.5)
Age 64&Coh.38 -2.2 -2.1 -1.8 -1.6 -3.2 -3.1
(2.0) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.4) (2.3)
Age 65&Coh.38 -3.0 -2.8 -0.9 -0.8 -3.7 -3.5
(1.8) (1.8) (1.2) (1.2) (2.3) (2.2)
Age 61&Coh.39 -0.4 -0.4 -0.0 0.1 -2.0 -2.1
(1.7) (1.7) (1.3) (1.3) (2.3) (2.3)
Age 62&Coh.39 -4.5 -4.2 -2.9 -2.4 -4.4 -3.9
(1.7)** (1.7)* (1.4)* (1.3) (2.4) (2.3)
Age 63&Coh.39 -3.6 -3.4 -3.5 -3.2 -3.5 -2.9
(1.8)* (1.8) (1.4)* (1.4)* (2.5) (2.5)
Age 64&Coh.39 -1.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.5 -2.9 -3.5
(1.7) (1.7) (1.4) (1.3) (2.4) (2.4)
Age 65&Coh.39 -1.3 -1.6 -1.4 -1.6 -1.1 -1.7
(1.6) (1.6) (1.3) (1.3) (2.2) (2.2)
Age 61&Coh.40 -3.0 -2.4 -1.6 -1.0 -2.6 -2.3
(1.9) (1.9) (1.5) (1.5) (2.5) (2.4)
Age 62&Coh.40 -8.4 -8.0 -5.4 -4.9 -6.3 -6.0
(2.0)** (2.0)** (1.5)** (1.5)** (2.5)* (2.4)*
Age 63&Coh.40 -5.6 -5.2 -4.2 -3.8 -7.6 -6.8
(2.1)** (2.1)* (1.6)* (1.6)* (2.7)** (2.6)**
Age 64&Coh.40 -4.0 -3.9 -3.2 -3.1 -5.8 -5.4
(2.1) (2.1) (1.6)* (1.6) (2.7)* (2.6)*
Age 65&Coh.40 -5.7 -5.1 -3.8 -3.3 -3.8 -3.5
(2.0)** (2.0)** (1.5)* (1.5)* (2.5) (2.5)
Other Xs no yes no yes no yes
Observations 388378 388378 371779 371779 74277 74277
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.54
NOTE.{ Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses, * signi¯cant at 5
percent, ** signi¯cant at 1 percent. Other Xs include marital status, education,
race, total members of the household, and geographic region.
30Table 6: ESTIMATED AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE (IN MONTHS) MINUS
THE 1937 COHORT AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE (FEMALE SAMPLE).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sophisticated Naive Restricted
1928 2.05 1.61 1.88 1.40 1.17 0.61
(0.39) ** (0.38) ** (0.35) ** (0.34) ** (0.59) * (0.58)
1929 1.31 0.87 1.77 1.25 1.98 1.30
(0.45) ** (0.44) * (0.35) ** (0.35) ** (0.59) ** (0.58) *
1930 1.43 0.80 1.76 1.12 1.62 0.87
(0.45) ** (0.44) (0.35) ** (0.34) ** (0.60) ** (0.58)
1931 0.99 0.58 1.33 0.87 1.25 0.50
(0.46) * (0.45) (0.36) ** (0.35) ** (0.61) * (0.60)
1932 0.80 0.32 1.34 0.81 0.64 0.05
(0.46) (0.45) (0.36) ** (0.35) * (0.62) (0.61)
1933 1.21 0.94 1.45 1.10 1.12 0.76
(0.49) ** (0.48) * (0.38) ** (0.37) ** (0.64) (0.63)
1934 0.72 0.37 1.08 0.69 0.26 -0.10
(0.49) (0.48) (0.38) ** (0.37) (0.64) (0.63)
1935 -0.07 -0.28 0.40 0.13 -0.41 -0.70
(0.48) (0.47) (0.38) (0.37) (0.65) (0.63)
1936 -0.40 -0.57 -0.02 -0.23 -0.01 -0.34
(0.54) (0.52) (0.37) (0.36) (0.64) (0.62)
1938 -1.82 -1.64 -1.28 -1.13 -1.16 -1.21
(0.52) ** (0.51) ** (0.35) ** (0.34) ** (0.63) (0.62) *
1939 -1.98 -1.58 -1.69 -1.32 -2.75 -2.51
(0.46) ** (0.44) ** (0.36) ** (0.35) ** (0.62) ** (0.61) **
1940 -2.34 -1.91 -1.75 -1.39 -3.27 -2.85
(0.54) ** (0.53) ** (0.42) ** (0.41) ** (0.67) ** (0.66) **
Other Xs no yes no yes no yes
NOTE.{ Sum of the coe±cients (multiplied by 12=100) of a given cohort excluding age 61. Other
Xs include marital status, education, race, total members of the household, and geographic region.
Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses, * signi¯cant at 5 percent, ** signi¯cant at
1 percent. The values in squared brackets represent the change in the average retirement age
divided by the change in the NRA.
31Table 7: ESTIMATED AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE (IN MONTHS) MINUS
THE 1937 COHORT AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE (MALE SAMPLE).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sophisticated Naive Restricted
1928 0.82 0.26 0.86 0.44 0.30 -0.07
(0.43) (0.42) (0.39) * (0.38) (0.65) (0.63)
1929 0.63 0.06 1.07 0.55 0.57 0.02
(0.49) (0.48) (0.39) ** (0.38) (0.66) (0.64)
1930 0.41 -0.01 1.20 0.80 0.68 0.39
(0.49) (0.48) (0.38) ** (0.37) * (0.66) (0.64)
1931 0.89 0.52 1.41 1.08 0.83 0.61
(0.50) (0.49) (0.39) ** (0.38) ** (0.67) (0.65)
1932 0.79 0.53 1.13 0.92 0.20 0.07
(0.51) (0.50) (0.40) ** (0.39) ** (0.68) (0.66)
1933 0.08 -0.15 0.74 0.53 1.31 1.20
(0.53) (0.52) (0.41) (0.40) (0.71) (0.69)
1934 0.06 -0.21 0.47 0.26 0.93 0.74
(0.54) (0.53) (0.42) (0.41) (0.70) (0.68)
1935 -0.37 -0.52 0.17 0.05 -0.43 -0.49
(0.52) (0.50) (0.41) (0.40) (0.70) (0.67)
1936 -0.79 -0.97 -0.18 -0.29 0.23 0.11
(0.57) (0.56) (0.39) (0.38) (0.69) (0.67)
1938 -1.95 -1.86 -0.98 -0.87 -1.99 -1.84
(0.56) ** (0.55) ** (0.38) ** (0.37) * (0.68) ** (0.66) **
1939 -1.25 -1.28 -1.08 -1.04 -1.43 -1.44
(0.49) ** (0.48) ** (0.39) ** (0.38) ** (0.67) * (0.65) *
1940 -2.85 -2.68 -1.99 -1.81 -2.83 -2.61
(0.57) ** (0.56) ** (0.44) ** (0.43) ** (0.71) ** (0.68) **
Other Xs no yes no yes no yes
NOTE.{ Sum of the coe±cients (multiplied by 12=100) of a given cohort excluding age 61. Other
Xs include marital status, education, race, total members of the household and geographic region.
Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses, * signi¯cant at 5 percent, ** signi¯cant at
1 percent. The values in squared brackets represent the change in the average retirement age
divided by the change in the NRA.
32Table 8: ESTIMATED TREND IN THE AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE (IN
MONTHS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sophisticated Naive Restricted
Panel A: Female Sample
C:1928{37 0.11 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.12 -0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) ** (0.09) (0.16) (0.15)
T:1938{40 1.20 1.02 0.90 0.75 1.21 1.14
(0.25) ** (0.25) ** (0.19) ** (0.18) ** (0.33) ** (0.32) **
T ¡ C: 1.08 1.00 0.67 0.63 1.09 1.15
(0.36) ** (0.35) ** (0.26) ** (0.25) ** (0.46) ** (0.45) **
Panel B: Male Sample
C:1928{37 -0.05 -0.12 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.06
(0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16)
T:1938{40 1.17 1.13 0.73 0.66 1.21 1.14
(0.27) ** (0.26) ** (0.20) ** (0.20) ** (0.35) ** (0.34) **
T ¡ C: 1.22 1.25 0.61 0.60 1.10 1.08
(0.38) ** (0.37) ** (0.28) * (0.27) * (0.49) * (0.47) *
Other Xs no yes no yes no yes
NOTE.{ Sum of the coe±cients (multiplied 12=100) of a given cohort excluding age 61. Other Xs
include marital status, education, race, total members of the household, and geographic region.
Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses, * signi¯cant at 5 percent, ** signi¯cant at
1 percent.
33